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Abstract
The celebrated in‡ationary bias of time consistent monetary policy
is re-examined. To this end we consider an extended version of the sim-
ple Barro and Gordon framework featuring important aspects of actual
policy making such as imperfect instrument control, overlapping wage
contracts, policy lags and interest rate control. The model developed
provides a counterexample to the standard theory as it yields the re-
sult that a de‡ationary bias may be possible as well. The rationale for
this surprising result is found in the distortion caused by instrument
uncertainty in the trade-o¤ between the costs and bene…ts associated
with surprisingly lower interest rates faced at the margin by the pol-
icy maker. If the size of uncertainty is relatively large the distortion
created may imply an optimal choice for the instrument which trades
o¤ the marginal bene…t of lower de‡ation against the marginal cost of
higher than optimal output. The implications of imprecise instrument
control for welfare are discussed too.
JEL classi…cation: E52; E58
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11 Introduction
The notion of time inconsistency, introduced in the economic literature by
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and examined in detail by Barro and Gordon
(1983) on its implications for monetary policy, is one of the explanations
given by economists for the apparent in‡ationary bias of economic policy.1
However, despite its popularity the issue of time inconsistency seems to be
quite controversial. There is general agreement on the presence of an in‡a-
tionary bias as in most countries in‡ation has risen above any conceivable
optimal rate during their economic history.2 On the contrary the importance
of the issue of time inconsistency in explaining it does not seem to share the
same level of agreement. The reasons for disagreement are various.
On one hand Taylor (1982, 1983) has suggested that, as societies have
found solutions to the time inconsistency problems arising in other areas
(e.g. patent law), then it is likely that the credibility problem of monetary
policy might not be particularly severe or even present. It seems unlikely
that a time consistent solution would prevail in situations where it is widely
recognised the superiority of the optimal rule. In other words the in‡ationary
bias may not be quantitatively relevant and therefore it does not need to be
tackled and eliminated.
On the other hand McCallum (1995, 1997) has suggested that even if the
in‡ationary bias might be quantitatively relevant (i.e. if societies have not
found a solution to it) central bankers can be trusted not to be tempted to
create in‡ation surprise as they know that this will lead to a worse equilib-
rium. According to this kind of criticism the Barro and Gordon model is not
a plausible positive model of in‡ation because the absence of precommitment
technologies does not prevent a central banker from behaving in a committed
fashion and private individuals to rationally expect such optimal behaviour.
1See for example Fischer (1994) and Cukierman (1992) for a review of the alternative
explanations given for the apparent in‡ationary bias of economic policy.
2A zero in‡ation rate target is usually considered optimal based on the many costs
of in‡ation (crf. Dri¢ll, Mizon and Ulph 1990). However Fischer (1994), for example,
discusses the cases in favor of a socially optimal in‡ation rate target between 1-3 per
cent. Recently Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) and Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) also
support the idea that the optimal in‡ation rate should be positive as this would help the
policymaker to adjust real shocks more easily in presence of a downward rigity of nominal
wages. Conversely Feldstein (1996) has suggested that the optimal in‡ation rate might
even be negative, as the tax distortions created by in‡ation may reduce permanently the
level of output.
2Another kind of criticism concerns the speci…cation of the Barro and
Gordon model. In particular it has been shown that the …nding of excessively
high average in‡ation under discretionary monetary policy might be related
to the simplicity of the model used. Here we have three major contributions.
First the in‡ationary bias associated with time consistent monetary pol-
icy has been questioned on the ground of lack of realism of the model used.
Goodhart and Huang (1998) show that if, in to the Barro and Gordon frame-
work, lags are introduced in the transmission of the e¤ects of monetary policy,
the in‡ationary bias disappears completely. The in‡ationary bias reappears
only when overlapping nominal wage contracts are incorporated in the anal-
ysis and contracts with a length greater than the length of the policy lag are
pervasive. But in this latter case the scale of the in‡ationary bias is consider-
ably reduced and the explanatory power of the time-inconsistency answer to
the apparent in‡ationary proclivities of industrialised countries is weakened.
Second, the Barro an Gordon model has been questioned also on the
ground of lack of microfoundations. Nicolini (1998) has shown that in a gen-
eral equilibrium monetary model the divergence between average in‡ation
in equilibrium and the socially optimal level of in‡ation may not necessarily
be of positive sign. In his framework the policy maker may …nd optimal to
deviate by choosing in‡ation rates lower than expected and hence a disin-
‡ationary bias may arise. Clearly this striking results eliminates completely
the issue of the importance of the time-inconsistency answer to the apparent
in‡ationary bias of economic policy.
A third point has been made by Nobay and Peel (1998). In particular,
they argue against the use of quadratic or linear preferences for examining
optimal policy, as is done by Barro and Gordon. By exploiting a procedure
used in Bayesian analysis, the Linex form, they analyse the implications of
asymmetric preferences. It is shown that in this case the standard in‡ation-
ary bias result under discretion does not hold unambiguously and there might
be a de‡ationary bias as well. Moreover, a de‡ationary bias prevails unam-
biguously under precommitment and in this case the deviation of in‡ation
from the socially optimal level is larger than under the case of discretion.
These criticisms have been partially left unanswered. Canzoneri (1985)
has shown that Taylor’s criticism does not hold when the policymaker has pri-
vate information and his action cannot be monitored perfectly. The criticism
concerning the size of the in‡ationary bias has been answered for example by
Walsh (1998, pp.369-375). In examining the issue of the importance of the
in‡ationary bias when there are policy lags and overlapping nominal wage
3contracts he observes that the presence of a reduced in‡ationary bias does
not mean that the issue of time inconsistency is unimportant. The simple
model used in the time inconsistency literature may not explain all observed
in‡ation but nevertheless it raises the important issue of the incentives to
deviate from optimal rules faced by policy makers.
In the present analysis we explore more deeply the third kind of criticism
described above and related to speci…cation issues. In particular we focus
on the issue of the lack of realism of the Barro and Gordon framework.
Thus we will examine how robust is the time-inconsistency explanation of
the apparent in‡ationary bias of economic policy to modi…cations in the
model’s speci…cation. Following Goodhart and Huang we extend the simple
model of Barro and Gordon by incorporating policy lags and overlapping
wage contracts. However, in contrast to them we focus on optimal interest
rate rules, rather than optimal money growth rules, and introduce also the
issue of instrument uncertainty. Therefore our framework is closer to actual
policy making where central banks adjust their short-term interest rate in
response to deviations of in‡ation and output from given targets and the
control of monetary aggregates has been progressively abandoned.3 Moreover
a further degree of realism is added with the introduction of instrument
uncertainty. Real world policy makers are subject to considerable uncertainty
about the e¤ects of policy on target variables and on instruments themselves.
Therefore there is also non negligible uncertainty about policy multipliers.
One of the main results of our analysis is that under certain circumstances
it is possible that a disin‡ationary bias may emerge as well as an in‡ationary
one. Hence our model provides a con…rmation for the …ndings of Nicolini and
Nobay and Peel. This surprising result implies that the time-inconsistency
explanation for the apparent positive in‡ationary bias becomes a quali…ed
one. In the subsequent sections we will show in detail under which circum-
stances Barro and Gordon’s celebrated result still holds in our framework.
The organisation of the exposition is the following. In section 2 we de-
scribe the model. In section 3 the equilibrium values are determined. Section
4 derives and discusses the main results of the analysis and compares them
3In the words of Blinder (1998, pp.26-29): ”Returning to Poole’s dichotomy [on the
choice of monetary instrument]...in the end, real-world events, not theory, decided the is-
sue. Ferocious instabilities in estimated LM curves in the United States, United Kingdom,
and many other countries, beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present day, led
economists and policymakers alike to conclude that money-supply targeting is simply not
a viable option....So interest rates won by default”.
4with those obtained in the previous literature. Finally, in section 5 some
concluding observations are made.
2 The model
Following Fischer (1977) we assume two-period overlapping nominal wage
contracts, which imply an aggregate supply function of the form
yt = yn +
®
2
(¼t ¡ Et¡1¼t) +
®
2
(¼t ¡ Et¡2¼t); (1)
where yn is the natural level of output, ¼t is the realised rate of in‡ation
and Et¡1¼t and Et¡2¼t are wage setters’ in‡ation expectations.4 Expectations
are formed rationally using all available information at the end of period
t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 2 respectively. The aggregate demand is given by a standard
IS function
yt = yn ¡ ¯ (rt¡1 ¡ Et¡1¼t ¡ ½); (2)
where ½ is the long-run real interest rate, rt¡1 is the nominal interest rate.
Here it is assumed that the interest rate, which is the instrument used for
conducting monetary policy, a¤ects output with a one-period lag.5 Moreover
we assume for simplicity that the monetary authority sets the instrument
in terms of deviations of the nominal interest rate from the constant long-
run real interest rate, it¡1 = rt¡1 ¡ ½. This assumption ensures that when
instrument uncertainty is introduced planned and actual level of the nominal
4As discussed in the introduction Goodhart and Huang (1998) and Walsh (1998) exam-
ine also the case of overlapping nominal wage contracts (along the lines of Fischer 1977)
with a one-period lag in the e¤ect of monetary policy. But in contrast to the present anal-
ysis they consider money supply as the instrument and the e¤ects of interest rate changes
on aggregate demand are ignored. Moreover the monetary authority is assumed to control
perfectly the money supply and the issue of instrument uncertainty does not arise.
5This speci…cation of the IS curve has been adopted for example by Ball (1997) and
Svensson (1997) in a recent analysis of optimal interest rate rules when the are lags in
the e¤ect of monetary policy. Unlike the present analysis they assume also that monetary
policy a¤ects in‡ation with a two-period lag . This assumption complicates the analysis
as it implies that in order to have a time-inconsistency problem we should introduce three-
period labor contracts. However this complication would not change the basic insights of
the analysis.
5interest rate are with high probability non negative . 6
As we want to examine the case of instrument uncertainty we assume
that the actual level of the instrument is determined in the following way:
it = 'ti
P
t + Ãt; (3)
which says that the monetary authority does not control the instrument
perfectly and the planned level will di¤er from the actual level due to the
presence of multiplicative control errors, 't, and additive control errors Ãt.
The assumption that the monetary authority does not control the instrument
perfectly may re‡ect the fact that the interest rate that can be controlled
more accurately is typically a short-term interest rate whereas in the aggre-
gate IS-curve the relevant interest rate is of long-term, which may not be
determined only by short-term interest rate movements.
At the same time the presence of control errors in the choice of the in-
strument may also re‡ect the possibility that there is uncertainty about the
e¤ects of the policy variable. This view is related to the stochastic opti-
mization literature with uncertainty about policy e¤ects started by Brainard
(1967). In particular Brainard has shown that uncertainty about the param-
eters in the relationship between the policy variable and the target variable
leads to a conservative use of the policy instrument.
In order to introduce a role for stabilisation policy, we assume that before
the planned level of the interest rate is chosen the monetary authority receives
a signal "t about the shock Ãt.7 Hence we have
6In the present framework the nominal interest rate can be negative for a small number
of periods depending on the realisations of the stochastic control shocks. The issue of
a non-negative nominal interest rate constraint is discussed in Lebow (1993), Cecchetti
(1997) and Rudebush and Svensson (1998). In practice a negative nominal interest rate is
not feasible but theoretical analysis usually does not exclude it, mainly in order to avoid
the complexity of introducing a non-negativity constraint. An example is Clark, Huang
and Goodhart (1999) where the level of the interest rate in the optimal decision rule for
the monetary authority is not constrained to be non-negative.
Following Rudebush and Svensson (1998), we examine the potential power of central
banks in conducting expansionary monetary policy and assume that there are always other
instruments available (e.g. unsterilised interventions or increasing liquidity by means of
open market purchases of Treasury securities at all maturities) when the nominal interest
rate is near to zero.
7In the present framework in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible we ignore
aggregate demand and supply shocks. As the model considered is static and assuming that
monetary authorities at period t have no advance information about the shocks in period
6Ãt = "t + ºt: (4)
We assume for analytical convenience that the shocks followa multivariate
normal distribution
0
@
't
"t
ºt
1
A s N3
0
@
0
@
1
0
0
1
A;
0
@
¾2
' 0 0
0 ¾2
" 0
0 0 ¾2
º
1
A
1
A;
where multiplicative control shocks have mean 1 and variance ¾2
' while
additive shocks have mean zero and variances ¾2
" and ¾2
º.8
The timing of the actions is the following: the …rst half of the workers …x
their nominal wages for two periods using information gathered at the end of
period t¡2; at the beginning of period t¡1 the monetary authority receives
a signal about the additive control error and sets the planned level of the
interest rate; subsequently the multiplicative and additive control errors are
realised; …nally the second half of the workers …x their nominal wages for two
periods using information up to the end of period t¡1. Thus in the present
model the monetary authority can potentially fool only the proportion of
workers that …x their nominal wage at the end of period t¡2, before monetary
policy is chosen. The workers that …x their nominal wages at the end of period
t ¡ 1 can observe perfectly the actual level of the interest rate.
Now equating output in (1) and (2) we have
¼t = ¡
¯
®
it¡1 +
1
2
Et¡1¼t +
¯
®
Et¡1¼t +
1
2
Et¡2¼t: (5)
From equation (5) we can derive the relationship between in‡ation and the
policy instrument. As there are no current shocks, current in‡ation is a¤ected
one period in advance by the lagged interest rate, in‡ation expectations of
half of the wage setters based on available information at t¡2 and in‡ation
expectations formed at the end of period t¡1. This implies that at the end
t+1, then the role of aggregate supply and demand shocks would be similar to that of the
unforecastable component of additive control shocks. The monetary authorities are not
able to stabilise these shocks and the optimal instrument feed-back rule will not depend
on them.
8See Schellekens (1998) for the same assumption on the stochastic structure of the
shocks in the context of Brainard uncertainty and time inconsistency. Di¤erently from
here he considers also the possibility that control shocks are not independent from each
other with the covariance being di¤erent from zero.
7of period t¡1 wage setters and investors can predict exactly the level of the
period t in‡ation rate. The implication for monetary policy is that now the
policy maker can no longer take expectations formed at the end of period
t ¡ 1 as given. Actually the policy maker’s choice made at t ¡ 1 can a¤ect
expectations immediately and therefore his ability to create surprise in‡ation
is weakened. Thus, after taking expectations at t ¡ 1, (5) becomes
¼t = ¡
2¯
® ¡ 2¯
it¡1 +
®
® ¡ 2¯
Et¡2¼t; (6)
with ¯ 6= ®=2.
Considering (3) and (4) and taking expectations at t¡2 of (6) we obtain
Et¡2¼t = Et¡2i
P
t¡1: (7)
Substituting (7) back into (6) we can express in‡ation in terms of the
control variable iP
t and the wage setters’ expectations of the level of the
control variable itself. Shifting one period forward we have
¼t+1 = ¡
2¯
® ¡ 2¯
¡
'ti
P
t + "t + ºt
¢
+
®
® ¡ 2¯
i
Pe
t ; (8)
where iPe
t = Et¡1iP
t , in order to simplify the notation.
Substituting (6) and (7) in (2) and shifting one period forward, output
can be expressed as
yt+1 = yn +
®¯
® ¡ 2¯
£
i
Pe
t ¡
¡
'ti
P
t + "t + ºt
¢¤
: (9)
By examining (8) and (9) it is possible to see that the e¤ects of changes
in the interest rate on output and in‡ation are ambiguous and depend on
the assumed parameter values in the model. In particular, an increase in
the actual level of the interest rate will reduce (increase) both output and
in‡ation if ¯ < ®=2 (if ¯ > ®=2): On the contrary an increase in the level of
the interest rate expected by the private sector will increase (reduce) both
output and in‡ation if ¯ < ®=2 (if ¯ > ®=2):
Nevertheless it is possible to show that the system represented by equa-
tions (1) and (2) will be stable and converge to the long-run equilibrium only
if ¯ < ®=2. To con…rm this take expectations through equations (1) and (2)
at t¡1 with the policy action iP
t¡1 and Et¡2¼t both …xed. In this way we have
that expected output Et¡1yt is an increasing function of expected in‡ation
8Et¡1¼t in both the supply and demand equations. Since the equilibrium is
a RE equilibrium, it is clear that there is a unique equilibrium and that it
occurs at the intersection of the two curves, no matter whether ¯ exceeds or
is less than ®=2. Now one can see that, if the expected demand curve (with
slope equal to ¯) is ‡atter than the expected supply curve (with slope equal
to ®=2), then higher than equilibrium expected in‡ation induces expected
excess supply. Conversely if, the expected demand curve is steeper than the
expected supply curve, then higher than equilibrium expected in‡ation in-
duces expected excess demand. Both cases imply adjustments over time of
the in‡ation rate towards its market-clearing value.
However the dynamic process of in‡ation will converge to its long-run
equilibrium value and at the same time lead to a dampening of the output
gap only if ¯ < ®=2. Assuming that the economy is composed of many small
…rms, with each producer setting its own price, in presence of market excess
demand each …rm would wish to charge a higher than market price; on the
contrary with excess market supply. Price setting by individual traders only
leads to a stable RE equilibrium if higher expected price reduces expected
excess demand.
The convergence requirement implies that the parameter that determines
the e¤ect of the expected real interest rate on goods demanded, ¯, must be
su¢ciently small compared to the elasticity of goods supplied with respect to
in‡ation surprises, ®.9 In the following analysis we assume that the conver-
gence requirement holds. Hence we have also that the impacts of monetary
policy on the target variables are the same of the standard IS-LM analysis:
an increase in the actual level of interest rate reduces both in‡ation and
output.
Finally the model is closed by the preferences of the monetary authority.
The policy maker chooses iP
t to minimise the following period loss function
Lt+1 = ¼
2
t+1 + ¸(yt+1 ¡ y)
2; (10)
which is the standard objective function considered in the literature on the
issue of time inconsistency in monetary policy. As usually, society is assumed
9The empirical literature on the expectations augmented Phillips curve has evidenced
some problems in isolating a signi…cantly positive e¤ect of price surprises on goods sup-
plied. See for example the recent empirical analysis provided by Barro and Broadbent
(1997). Moreover, to our knowledge, Fischer’s model of overlapping nominal wage con-
tracts has not been empirically tested. So the empirical literature does not provide clear
insights into the relative importance of the two parameters examined.
9to have the same preferences as the policy maker. Thus (10) represents
also society’s period loss function. The policy maker weights deviations of
in‡ation and output from speci…ed target values with ¸ > 0. Here a standard
assumption is that the policy maker has an output target greater than the
natural level of output, i.e. y > yn:
3 Time consistent equilibrium
The discretionary solution of the model is derived by minimising the ex-
pected value of the loss function (10) with respect to iP
t ; conditional on the
information set of the policy maker when iP
t is chosen,
min
iP
t
E [Lt+1 j "]; (11)
subject to (8) and (9) and taking as given the private sector’s expectations
iPe
t . We have the following …rst order condition:
µ
¡
2¯
® ¡ 2¯
¡
'ti
P
t + "t + ºt
¢
+
®
® ¡ 2¯
i
Pe
t
¶µ
¡
4¯'
® ¡ 2¯
¶
+¸
µ
yn +
®¯
® ¡ 2¯
¡
i
Pe
t ¡ 'ti
P
t ¡ "t ¡ ºt
¢
¡ y
¶µ
¡
2¯®'
® ¡ 2¯
¶
= 0; (12)
which becomes, after taking expectations conditional on the signal "t and
simplifying:
2
µ
¡
2¯
® ¡ 2¯
¡¡
1 + ¾
2
'
¢
i
P
t + "t
¢
+
®
® ¡ 2¯
i
Pe
t
¶
+¸®
µ
yn +
®¯
® ¡ 2¯
¡
i
Pe
t ¡
¡
1 + ¾
2
'
¢
i
P
t ¡ "t
¢
¡ y
¶
= 0; (13)
where we have used the fact that E ['2] = 1 + ¾2
'. Rearranging the …rst
order condition we get the monetary authority reaction function
i
P
t =
(2¯ ¡ ®)¸®(y ¡ yn)
¯ (4 + ¸®2)
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢ +
®(2 + ¸®¯)
¯ (4 + ¸®2)
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢i
Pe
t ¡
1
1 + ¾2
'
"t:
(14)
10The private sector’s expectations are found by taking expectations at time
t ¡ 1 over the policy maker’s reaction function which yields
i
Pe
t =
(2¯ ¡ ®)¸®(y ¡ yn)
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
: (15)
Thus the optimal instrument feed-back rule will be
i
P
t =
(2¯ ¡ ®)¸®(y ¡ yn)
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¡
1
1 + ¾2
'
"t; (16)
which implies that after the control error shocks are realised the actual
level of the nominal interest rate will be
it =
't(2¯ ¡ ®)¸®(y ¡ yn)
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¡
£
't ¡
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢¤
1 + ¾2
'
"t + ºt: (17)
Now we are able to …nd the equilibrium values for in‡ation and output.
Substituting (15) and (16) back into the expressions for in‡ation and output
we get
¼t+1 =
(2¯'t ¡ ®)¸®(y ¡ yn)
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¡
2¯
£
't ¡
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢¤
(2¯ ¡ ®)
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢ "t +
2¯
2¯ ¡ ®
ºt;
(18)
and
yt+1 =
®¯ ('t ¡ 1)¸®(y ¡ yn)
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¡
®¯
£
't ¡
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢¤
(2¯ ¡ ®)
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢ "t +
®¯
2¯ ¡ ®
ºt:
(19)
4 Implications of multiplicative instrument un-
certainty
Here we investigate the implications of the introduction of multiplicative
uncertainty comparing the results obtained in the previous section with the
case when there is only additive uncertainty. When the policy maker faces
11imperfect information aboutthe shocks hitting the economy itshould respond
on the basis of its best forecast of these shocks. However Brainard (1967)
showed that this is no longer true when there is multiplicative uncertainty in
the parameters of the relationship between the level of the policy instrument
and the goal variable. In this case uncertainty implies that the policy choices
a¤ect the shape of the distribution of the goal variable and that it is optimal
to adjust less than completely to the disturbances.
As in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Swank (1994) and Letterie
(1997), in the next sections it is assumed that ¾2
' is an institutional feature
of the implementation of monetary policy. The volatility of multiplicative
control errors is chosen by the policy maker ex-ante and cannot be modi…ed
after the private sector’s expectations about the instrument are set. This
assumption is based on the idea that, unlike policy choices, institutional
operating procedures can be changed only with a time lag which is greater
than the horizon of existing nominal contracts.
4.1 In‡ation
Following the same algorithm used for deriving the discretionary solution it is
easy to …nd that without multiplicative uncertainty the optimal instrument
feed-back rule and the equilibrium in‡ation rate are given respectively by
i
AD
t =
¸®(y ¡ yn)
2
¡ "t; (20)
¼
AD
t+1 =
¸®(y ¡ yn)
2
+
2¯
2¯ ¡ ®
ºt; (21)
where iAD
t , ¼AD
t+1 are the level of the monetary instrument and the in‡ation
rate when there is only additive uncertainty.
By taking unconditional expectations we can get the in‡ationary bias in
the two cases examined.10 We have
10The bias in average in‡ation under a time consistent monetary policy is de…ned relative
to a hypothetical regime where the policy maker is able to credibly precommit in advance
to a rule for setting the monetary instrument. The precommitment solution can be found
assuming that the policy maker sets the interest rate according to the following rule:
iP
t = Á + Á"t. The policymaker minimises his expected loss with respect to both the
systematic and the state contingent components of the rule, respectively Á and Á: In
contrast to a discretionary regime, in a regime with precommitment the policy maker
internalises in its optimisation problem the e¤ects of its decision rule on expectations by
12E
£
¼
AD¤
=
¸®(y ¡ yn)
2
; (22)
and
E [¼] =
(2¯ ¡ ®)¸®(y ¡ yn)
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
: (23)
The variances of in‡ation are given by
V ar
£
¼
AD¤
=
µ
2¯
2¯ ¡ ®
¶2
¾
2
º; (24)
and
V ar[¼] =
[2¯¸®(y ¡ yn)]
2¾2
'
£
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¤2 +
(2¯)
2 ¾2
' ¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢
(2¯ ¡ ®)
2¾
2
"
+
µ
2¯
2¯ ¡ ®
¶2
¾
2
º; (25)
where we used that V ar [¼] = E [¼2] ¡ (E [¼])
2 and given the properties
of the trivariate normal distribution considered here we can compute the
following joint moments E ['2"] = E ["'º] = 0; E ['"2] = ¾2
" and E ['2"2] = ¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢
¾2
":
From (22) and (23) it is possible to derive one of the main results of the
present analysis:
Proposition 1 . Multiplicative uncertainty has an ambiguous e¤ect on av-
erage in‡ation: if the amount of multiplicative uncertainty is relatively large
(small) it implies a de‡ationary (in‡ationary) bias.
From (23) it is straightforward to verify that, for
¾
2
' > 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯
¡
4 + ¸®
2¢
; (26)
setting iPe
t = Á. Deriving the …rst order conditions and taking unconditional expectations
it is possible to see that in equilibrium average in‡ation will be equal to zero, independently
of whether multiplicative uncertainty is present or not. However it is possible to see that,
if the socially optimal level of in‡ation is greater than zero, in the case of commitment we
may have a de‡ationary bias too.
13average in‡ation under a time consistent monetary policy will be negative;
otherwise it will always be positive.
The intuition for this surprising result is as follows. The result obtained
is independent of the additive component of the control errors. So assume
…rst that there is no instrument uncertainty and then introduce only multi-
plicative uncertainty. If there is no instrument uncertainty both the planned
level of the instrument (here equal to the actual level) and average in‡a-
tion are positive and are respectively given by (20), without the stochastic
term, and (22). From the …rst order condition (13) it is possible to see that
when ¾2
' = 0 and "t = 0 the policymaker will set the planned level of the
instrument at the point where the marginal cost of higher in‡ation with a
lower (surprise) interest rate compensates exactly the marginal bene…t (with
negative sign) of higher output with a lower (surprise) interest rate.
Now introduce multiplicative uncertainty with ¾2
' su¢ciently large. In
this case both the planned level of the instrument and average in‡ation have
negative sign and are respectively given by (16), without the stochastic term,
and (23). From the …rst order condition it is possible to see that the introduc-
tion of a small increase of ¾2
' distorts at the margin both the costs of higher
in‡ation and bene…ts of higher output from creating surprisingly lower in-
terest rates. In order to compensate these distortions a further reduction of
the instrument with respect to the given expectations is required. If ¾2
' is
su¢ciently large the policy maker will end up trading-o¤ the marginal bene-
…ts of lower de‡ation with the marginal costs of higher than optimal output
deriving from surprisingly higher negative levels of the instrument. Thus,
in the end, the reason for our new result is that multiplicative instrument
uncertainty distorts the trade-o¤ faced at the margin by the policy maker
when choosing the optimal level of the instrument.
Still from (23) we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 . Multiplicative uncertainty always worsens the stabilisa-
tion role of the instrument but the e¤ect on the credibility of monetary policy
is ambiguous: if the amount of multiplicative uncertainty is relatively large
(small) it improves (deteriorates) credibility.
Comparing the instrument feed-back rules (16) and (20) is clear that mul-
tiplicative uncertainty makes it optimal for the policymaker to stabilise less
the forecast additive control error and to adopt greater caution in conducting
monetary policy. The e¤ect of multiplicative uncertainty on average in‡ation
can be analysed from the following …rst derivative
14@E [¼]
@¾2
'
= ¡
2¯¾2
' (2¯ ¡ ®)(4 + ¸®2)¸®(y ¡ yn)
£
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¤2 > 0; (27)
with
¾
2
' 6= 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯
¡
4 + ¸®
2¢
: (28)
Here we have the following cases:
i) for 0 < ¾2
' < 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯ (4 + ¸®2) the in‡ationary bias under multi-
plicative uncertainty is increased as ¾2
' increases;
ii) for ¾2
' > 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯ (4 + ¸®2) > 0 the de‡ationary bias under mul-
tiplicative uncertainty is reduced as ¾2
' increases.
This ambiguous e¤ect of multiplicative uncertainty on the credibility of
monetary policy is new in the time inconsistency literature. The standard
result, as exempli…ed by Swank (1994), Pearce and Sobue (1997), Letterie
(1997), Letterie and Lippi (1997) and Schellekens (1998), is that multi-
plicative uncertainty unambiguously improves the credibility of discretionary
monetary policy by inducing a more cautious stance of monetary policy. Thus
the standard result is that imperfect monetary control constrains the temp-
tations of the policymaker to surprise the private sector. However in all these
models the policy instrument is the supply of money and the issues of lags
in the transmission of the e¤ects of monetary policy and overlapping nom-
inal wage contracts are excluded from the analysis. Here we show that in
a more complex model, closer to actual policy making, the e¤ect of multi-
plicative uncertainty on credibility is ambiguous and depends on the level of
the volatility of multiplicative control errors. This ambiguity stems from the
possibility in our model of having under the time consistent monetary policy
both a de‡ationary bias and an in‡ationary bias.
Finally we consider the implications of the introduction of multiplicative
uncertainty for the variance of in‡ation. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 . The introduction of a marginal increase of multiplicative
uncertainty unambiguously increases the volatility of in‡ation.
This proposition follows from the …rst derivative of (25) which can be
showed to be
@V ar[¼]
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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154.2 Output
Without multiplicative uncertainty equilibrium output is
y
AD
t+1 = yn ¡
®¯
® ¡ 2¯
ºt: (30)
Let’s take unconditional expectations of (19) and (30). In both cases
expected output will be equal to the natural level
E [y] = E
£
y
AD¤
= yn; (31)
while the variances of output are given by
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º; (32)
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Here we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 . The introduction of a marginal increase of multiplicative
uncertainty unambiguously increases the volatility of output.
This proposition follows from the …rst derivative of (33) which can be
shown to be
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164.3 Social welfare
Let’s analyse the implications of multiplicative uncertainty for social wel-
fare. The unconditional expectation over society’s period loss function can
be expressed in the following convenient way
E [L] = (E [¼])
2 + V ar[¼] + ¸y
2 + ¸V ar[y]: (35)
After substituting the relative expressions for the variances and uncondi-
tional expectations under the two cases here considered we have
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Now it is possible to show the following proposition:
Proposition 5 . If the amount of multiplicative uncertainty is relatively
small its introduction is welfare decreasing. On the contrary if its amount
is su¢ciently large multiplicative uncertainty has an ambiguous e¤ect on the
expected social loss which depends on the relative importance of the credibility
problem with respect to the ‡exibility problem: the larger is the credibility
problem with respect to the ‡exibility problem the more likely multiplicative
uncertainty improves social welfare.
The overall e¤ect of multiplicative uncertainty on social loss can be ex-
amined from the following …rst derivative
@E [L]
@¾2
'
= ¡
£
2(¯ ¡ ®)(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯
2¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¤
(4 + ¸®2)¯ [®¸(y ¡ yn)]
2
£
2(2¯ ¡ ®) + ¯¾2
' (4 + ¸®2)
¤3
+
(4 + ¸®2)¯
2
¡
1 + ¾2
'
¢2(2¯ ¡ ®)
2¾
2
"; (38)
17with
¾
2
' 6= 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯
¡
4 + ¸®
2¢
: (39)
Here we have two cases depending on the dimension of multiplicative
uncertainty:
i) for ¾2
' < 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯ (4 + ¸®2), we have
@E [L]
@¾2
'
> 0; (40)
ii) for ¾2
' > 2(® ¡ 2¯)=¯ (4 + ¸®2), we have
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Thus, if the credibility problem is large enough relatively to the ‡exibil-
ity problem, the introduction of su¢cient multiplicative uncertainty is likely
to reduce the social loss compared to the case when there is only additive
instrument uncertainty. A similar result has been found, for example, also
by Schellekens (1998), Letterie (1997) and Letterie and Lippi (1997). They
found contrary to Swank (1994), where multiplicative uncertainty always im-
proves social welfare, that the e¤ect of multiplicative uncertainty on social
welfare is ambiguous depending on the size of the credibility problem. De-
vereux (1987) has provided the same result also for the case when there is
only additive uncertainty. Using a model with endogenous wage indexing,
along the lines of Gray (1976), he has shown that uncertainty is more likely
to increase welfare when the credibility problem becomes more important.
The main di¤erence of our analysis with respect to the previous literature
is that now when multiplicative uncertainty becomes more advantageous at
the same time the occurrence of a de‡ationary bias is more likely.
185 Conclusions
In the present analysis we have tried to re-examine the issue of the in‡ation-
ary bias associated with discretionary monetary policy by using an extended
version of the Barro and Gordon framework, closer to actual policymaking.
The model developed has yielded some results that question the previous
…ndings. In particular we have shown that time inconsistency does not nec-
essarily imply an in‡ationary bias, but may yield a de‡ationary one instead.
In this respect our framework under speci…ed circumstances provides a coun-
terexample to Barro and Gordon’s famous result.
This surprising …ndingimplies that the current use of the time-inconsistency
paradigm as a possible explanation of episodes of persistent and excessively
high in‡ation rates should be more cautious. Actually, our model predicts
that economies which feature a relatively large incentive to increase output
above its long-run level are more likely to be plagued by a de‡ationary bias.
In this case the implementation of policy should be characterised by a rela-
tively more imprecise control of the policy instrument. An In‡ationary bias
is more likely to be present in economies where the credibility problem is rela-
tively less serious. Here the implementation of policy should be characterised
by a relatively better control of the policy instrument.
Some recent works by Nicolini, Nobay and Peel have shown that Barro
and Gordon’s in‡ationary bias result is not robust to interesting modi…cations
of the original framework. In particular they have examined the implications
of the introduction of microfoundations, with a general equilibrium model,
and asymmetric central bank preferences. Our analysis has con…rmed the
above …nding.
However, in contrast to Nicolini we have used a framework closer to that
used by Barro and Gordon, while unlike Nobay and Peel we do not obtain
a de‡ationary bias under a regime with commitment and the superiority of
the ex ante optimal monetary policy still holds in our model. The latter
result crucially depends on the assumptions about the socially optimal level
of in‡ation. If we assume an in‡ation target greater than zero in the policy
maker’s loss function, we may have in our framework a de‡ationary bias also
in the case of commitment.
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